#ifndef SECP256K1_H

#define SECP256K1_H

#ifdef __cplusplus

extern "C" {

#endif

#include <stddef.h>

/** Unless explicitly stated all pointer arguments must not be NULL.

 *

 * The following rules specify the order of arguments in API calls:

 *

 * 1. Context pointers go first, followed by output arguments, combined

 *    output/input arguments, and finally input-only arguments.

 * 2. Array lengths always immediately follow the argument whose length

 *    they describe, even if this violates rule 1.

 * 3. Within the OUT/OUTIN/IN groups, pointers to data that is typically generated

 *    later go first. This means: signatures, public nonces, secret nonces,

 *    messages, public keys, secret keys, tweaks.

 * 4. Arguments that are not data pointers go last, from more complex to less

 *    complex: function pointers, algorithm names, messages, void pointers,

 *    counts, flags, booleans.

 * 5. Opaque data pointers follow the function pointer they are to be passed to.

 */

/** Opaque data structure that holds context information

 *

 *  The primary purpose of context objects is to store randomization data for

 *  enhanced protection against side-channel leakage. This protection is only

 *  effective if the context is randomized after its creation. See

 *  secp256k1_context_create for creation of contexts and

 *  secp256k1_context_randomize for randomization.

 *

 *  A secondary purpose of context objects is to store pointers to callback

 *  functions that the library will call when certain error states arise. See

 *  secp256k1_context_set_error_callback as well as

 *  secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback for details. Future library versions

 *  may use context objects for additional purposes.

 *

 *  A constructed context can safely be used from multiple threads

 *  simultaneously, but API calls that take a non-const pointer to a context

 *  need exclusive access to it. In particular this is the case for

 *  secp256k1_context_destroy, secp256k1_context_preallocated_destroy,

 *  and secp256k1_context_randomize.

 *

 *  Regarding randomization, either do it once at creation time (in which case

 *  you do not need any locking for the other calls), or use a read-write lock.

 */

typedef struct secp256k1_context_struct secp256k1_context;

/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed and valid public key.

 *

 *  The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not

 *  guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is

 *  however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved.

 *  If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage or transmission,

 *  use secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse. To

 *  compare keys, use secp256k1_ec_pubkey_cmp.

 */

typedef struct secp256k1_pubkey {

    unsigned char data[64];

} secp256k1_pubkey;

/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed ECDSA signature.

 *

 *  The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not

 *  guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is

 *  however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved.

 *  If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, or

 *  comparison, use the secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* and

 *  secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_* functions.

 */

typedef struct secp256k1_ecdsa_signature {

    unsigned char data[64];

} secp256k1_ecdsa_signature;

/** A pointer to a function to deterministically generate a nonce.

 *

 * Returns: 1 if a nonce was successfully generated. 0 will cause signing to fail.

 * Out:     nonce32:   pointer to a 32-byte array to be filled by the function.

 * In:      msg32:     the 32-byte message hash being verified (will not be NULL)

 *          key32:     pointer to a 32-byte secret key (will not be NULL)

 *          algo16:    pointer to a 16-byte array describing the signature

 *                     algorithm (will be NULL for ECDSA for compatibility).

 *          data:      Arbitrary data pointer that is passed through.

 *          attempt:   how many iterations we have tried to find a nonce.

 *                     This will almost always be 0, but different attempt values

 *                     are required to result in a different nonce.

 *

 * Except for test cases, this function should compute some cryptographic hash of

 * the message, the algorithm, the key and the attempt.

 */

typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function)(

    unsigned char *nonce32,

    const unsigned char *msg32,

    const unsigned char *key32,

    const unsigned char *algo16,

    void *data,

    unsigned int attempt

);

# if !defined(SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ)

#  if defined(__GNUC__)&&defined(__GNUC_MINOR__)

#   define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) \

 ((__GNUC__<<16)+__GNUC_MINOR__>=((_maj)<<16)+(_min))

#  else

#   define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) 0

#  endif

# endif

/*  When this header is used at build-time the SECP256K1_BUILD define needs to be set

 *  to correctly setup export attributes and nullness checks.  This is normally done

 *  by secp256k1.c but to guard against this header being included before secp256k1.c

 *  has had a chance to set the define (e.g. via test harnesses that just includes

 *  secp256k1.c) we set SECP256K1_NO_BUILD when this header is processed without the

 *  BUILD define so this condition can be caught.

 */

#ifndef SECP256K1_BUILD

# define SECP256K1_NO_BUILD

#endif

/* Symbol visibility. */

#if defined(_WIN32)

  /* GCC for Windows (e.g., MinGW) accepts the __declspec syntax

   * for MSVC compatibility. A __declspec declaration implies (but is not

   * exactly equivalent to) __attribute__ ((visibility("default"))), and so we

   * actually want __declspec even on GCC, see "Microsoft Windows Function

   * Attributes" in the GCC manual and the recommendations in

   * https://gcc.gnu.org/wiki/Visibility. */

# if defined(SECP256K1_BUILD)

#  if defined(DLL_EXPORT) || defined(SECP256K1_DLL_EXPORT)

    /* Building libsecp256k1 as a DLL.

     * 1. If using Libtool, it defines DLL_EXPORT automatically.

     * 2. In other cases, SECP256K1_DLL_EXPORT must be defined. */

#   define SECP256K1_API extern __declspec (dllexport)

#  else

    /* Building libsecp256k1 as a static library on Windows.

     * No declspec is needed, and so we would want the non-Windows-specific

     * logic below take care of this case. However, this may result in setting

     * __attribute__ ((visibility("default"))), which is supposed to be a noop

     * on Windows but may trigger warnings when compiling with -flto due to a

     * bug in GCC, see

     * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=116478 . */

#   define SECP256K1_API extern

#  endif

  /* The user must define SECP256K1_STATIC when consuming libsecp256k1 as a static

   * library on Windows. */

# elif !defined(SECP256K1_STATIC)

   /* Consuming libsecp256k1 as a DLL. */

#  define SECP256K1_API extern __declspec (dllimport)

# endif

#endif

#ifndef SECP256K1_API

/* All cases not captured by the Windows-specific logic. */

# if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ >= 4) && defined(SECP256K1_BUILD)

   /* Building libsecp256k1 using GCC or compatible. */

#  define SECP256K1_API extern __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))

# else

   /* Fall back to standard C's extern. */

#  define SECP256K1_API extern

# endif

#endif

/* Warning attributes

 * NONNULL is not used if SECP256K1_BUILD is set to avoid the compiler optimizing out

 * some paranoid null checks. */

# if defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4)

#  define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT __attribute__ ((__warn_unused_result__))

# else

#  define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT

# endif

# if !defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) && defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4)

#  define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x)  __attribute__ ((__nonnull__(_x)))

# else

#  define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x)

# endif

/* Attribute for marking functions, types, and variables as deprecated */

#if !defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) && defined(__has_attribute)

# if __has_attribute(__deprecated__)

#  define SECP256K1_DEPRECATED(_msg) __attribute__ ((__deprecated__(_msg)))

# else

#  define SECP256K1_DEPRECATED(_msg)

# endif

#else

# define SECP256K1_DEPRECATED(_msg)

#endif

/* All flags' lower 8 bits indicate what they're for. Do not use directly. */

#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK ((1 << 8) - 1)

#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT (1 << 0)

#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION (1 << 1)

/* The higher bits contain the actual data. Do not use directly. */

#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY (1 << 8)

#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN (1 << 9)

#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY (1 << 10)

#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION (1 << 8)

/** Context flags to pass to secp256k1_context_create, secp256k1_context_preallocated_size, and

 *  secp256k1_context_preallocated_create. */

#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT)

/** Deprecated context flags. These flags are treated equivalent to SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE. */

#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY)

#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN)

/* Testing flag. Do not use. */

#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY)

/** Flag to pass to secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize. */

#define SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION)

#define SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION)

/** Prefix byte used to tag various encoded curvepoints for specific purposes */

#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_EVEN 0x02

#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_ODD 0x03

#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_UNCOMPRESSED 0x04

#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_EVEN 0x06

#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_ODD 0x07

/** A built-in constant secp256k1 context object with static storage duration, to be

 *  used in conjunction with secp256k1_selftest.

 *

 *  This context object offers *only limited functionality* , i.e., it cannot be used

 *  for API functions that perform computations involving secret keys, e.g., signing

 *  and public key generation. If this restriction applies to a specific API function,

 *  it is mentioned in its documentation. See secp256k1_context_create if you need a

 *  full context object that supports all functionality offered by the library.

 *

 *  It is highly recommended to call secp256k1_selftest before using this context.

 */

SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_context * const secp256k1_context_static;

/** Deprecated alias for secp256k1_context_static. */

SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_context * const secp256k1_context_no_precomp

SECP256K1_DEPRECATED("Use secp256k1_context_static instead");

/** Perform basic self tests (to be used in conjunction with secp256k1_context_static)

 *

 *  This function performs self tests that detect some serious usage errors and

 *  similar conditions, e.g., when the library is compiled for the wrong endianness.

 *  This is a last resort measure to be used in production. The performed tests are

 *  very rudimentary and are not intended as a replacement for running the test

 *  binaries.

 *

 *  It is highly recommended to call this before using secp256k1_context_static.

 *  It is not necessary to call this function before using a context created with

 *  secp256k1_context_create (or secp256k1_context_preallocated_create), which will

 *  take care of performing the self tests.

 *

 *  If the tests fail, this function will call the default error handler to abort the

 *  program (see secp256k1_context_set_error_callback).

 */

SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_selftest(void);

/** Create a secp256k1 context object (in dynamically allocated memory).

 *

 *  This function uses malloc to allocate memory. It is guaranteed that malloc is

 *  called at most once for every call of this function. If you need to avoid dynamic

 *  memory allocation entirely, see secp256k1_context_static and the functions in

 *  secp256k1_preallocated.h.

 *

 *  Returns: pointer to a newly created context object.

 *  In:      flags: Always set to SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE (see below).

 *

 *  The only valid non-deprecated flag in recent library versions is

 *  SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, which will create a context sufficient for all functionality

 *  offered by the library. All other (deprecated) flags will be treated as equivalent

 *  to the SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE flag. Though the flags parameter primarily exists for

 *  historical reasons, future versions of the library may introduce new flags.

 *

 *  If the context is intended to be used for API functions that perform computations

 *  involving secret keys, e.g., signing and public key generation, then it is highly

 *  recommended to call secp256k1_context_randomize on the context before calling

 *  those API functions. This will provide enhanced protection against side-channel

 *  leakage, see secp256k1_context_randomize for details.

 *

 *  Do not create a new context object for each operation, as construction and

 *  randomization can take non-negligible time.

 */

SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context *secp256k1_context_create(

    unsigned int flags

) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;

/** Copy a secp256k1 context object (into dynamically allocated memory).

 *

 *  This function uses malloc to allocate memory. It is guaranteed that malloc is

 *  called at most once for every call of this function. If you need to avoid dynamic

 *  memory allocation entirely, see the functions in secp256k1_preallocated.h.

 *

 *  Cloning secp256k1_context_static is not possible, and should not be emulated by

 *  the caller (e.g., using memcpy). Create a new context instead.

 *

 *  Returns: pointer to a newly created context object.

 *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context to copy (not secp256k1_context_static).

 */

SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context *secp256k1_context_clone(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;

/** Destroy a secp256k1 context object (created in dynamically allocated memory).

 *

 *  The context pointer may not be used afterwards.

 *

 *  The context to destroy must have been created using secp256k1_context_create

 *  or secp256k1_context_clone. If the context has instead been created using

 *  secp256k1_context_preallocated_create or secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone, the

 *  behaviour is undefined. In that case, secp256k1_context_preallocated_destroy must

 *  be used instead.

 *

 *  Args:   ctx: pointer to a context to destroy, constructed using

 *               secp256k1_context_create or secp256k1_context_clone

 *               (i.e., not secp256k1_context_static).

 */

SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_destroy(

    secp256k1_context *ctx

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);

/** Set a callback function to be called when an illegal argument is passed to

 *  an API call. It will only trigger for violations that are mentioned

 *  explicitly in the header.

 *

 *  The philosophy is that these shouldn't be dealt with through a

 *  specific return value, as calling code should not have branches to deal with

 *  the case that this code itself is broken.

 *

 *  On the other hand, during debug stage, one would want to be informed about

 *  such mistakes, and the default (crashing) may be inadvisable.

 *  When this callback is triggered, the API function called is guaranteed not

 *  to cause a crash, though its return value and output arguments are

 *  undefined.

 *

 *  When this function has not been called (or called with fn==NULL), then the

 *  default handler will be used. The library provides a default handler which

 *  writes the message to stderr and calls abort. This default handler can be

 *  replaced at link time if the preprocessor macro

 *  USE_EXTERNAL_DEFAULT_CALLBACKS is defined, which is the case if the build

 *  has been configured with --enable-external-default-callbacks. Then the

 *  following two symbols must be provided to link against:

 *   - void secp256k1_default_illegal_callback_fn(const char *message, void *data);

 *   - void secp256k1_default_error_callback_fn(const char *message, void *data);

 *  The library can call these default handlers even before a proper callback data

 *  pointer could have been set using secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback or

 *  secp256k1_context_set_error_callback, e.g., when the creation of a context

 *  fails. In this case, the corresponding default handler will be called with

 *  the data pointer argument set to NULL.

 *

 *  Args: ctx:  pointer to a context object.

 *  In:   fun:  pointer to a function to call when an illegal argument is

 *              passed to the API, taking a message and an opaque pointer.

 *              (NULL restores the default handler.)

 *        data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above, must be NULL for the default handler.

 *

 *  See also secp256k1_context_set_error_callback.

 */

SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(

    secp256k1_context *ctx,

    void (*fun)(const char *message, void *data),

    const void *data

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);

/** Set a callback function to be called when an internal consistency check

 *  fails.

 *

 *  The default callback writes an error message to stderr and calls abort

 *  to abort the program.

 *

 *  This can only trigger in case of a hardware failure, miscompilation,

 *  memory corruption, serious bug in the library, or other error would can

 *  otherwise result in undefined behaviour. It will not trigger due to mere

 *  incorrect usage of the API (see secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback

 *  for that). After this callback returns, anything may happen, including

 *  crashing.

 *

 *  Args: ctx:  pointer to a context object.

 *  In:   fun:  pointer to a function to call when an internal error occurs,

 *              taking a message and an opaque pointer (NULL restores the

 *              default handler, see secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback

 *              for details).

 *        data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above, must be NULL for the default handler.

 *

 *  See also secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback.

 */

SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(

    secp256k1_context *ctx,

    void (*fun)(const char *message, void *data),

    const void *data

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);

/** Parse a variable-length public key into the pubkey object.

 *

 *  Returns: 1 if the public key was fully valid.

 *           0 if the public key could not be parsed or is invalid.

 *  Args: ctx:      pointer to a context object.

 *  Out:  pubkey:   pointer to a pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set to a

 *                  parsed version of input. If not, its value is undefined.

 *  In:   input:    pointer to a serialized public key

 *        inputlen: length of the array pointed to by input

 *

 *  This function supports parsing compressed (33 bytes, header byte 0x02 or

 *  0x03), uncompressed (65 bytes, header byte 0x04), or hybrid (65 bytes, header

 *  byte 0x06 or 0x07) format public keys.

 */

SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,

    const unsigned char *input,

    size_t inputlen

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);

/** Serialize a pubkey object into a serialized byte sequence.

 *

 *  Returns: 1 always.

 *  Args:   ctx:        pointer to a context object.

 *  Out:    output:     pointer to a 65-byte (if compressed==0) or 33-byte (if

 *                      compressed==1) byte array to place the serialized key

 *                      in.

 *  In/Out: outputlen:  pointer to an integer which is initially set to the

 *                      size of output, and is overwritten with the written

 *                      size.

 *  In:     pubkey:     pointer to a secp256k1_pubkey containing an

 *                      initialized public key.

 *          flags:      SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED if serialization should be in

 *                      compressed format, otherwise SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED.

 */

SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    unsigned char *output,

    size_t *outputlen,

    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,

    unsigned int flags

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);

/** Compare two public keys using lexicographic (of compressed serialization) order

 *

 *  Returns: <0 if the first public key is less than the second

 *           >0 if the first public key is greater than the second

 *           0 if the two public keys are equal

 *  Args: ctx:      pointer to a context object

 *  In:   pubkey1:  first public key to compare

 *        pubkey2:  second public key to compare

 */

SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_cmp(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey1,

    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey2

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);

/** Sort public keys using lexicographic (of compressed serialization) order

 *

 *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise.

 *

 *  Args:     ctx: pointer to a context object

 *  In:   pubkeys: array of pointers to pubkeys to sort

 *      n_pubkeys: number of elements in the pubkeys array

 */

SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_sort(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    const secp256k1_pubkey **pubkeys,

    size_t n_pubkeys

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2);

/** Parse an ECDSA signature in compact (64 bytes) format.

 *

 *  Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise.

 *  Args: ctx:      pointer to a context object

 *  Out:  sig:      pointer to a signature object

 *  In:   input64:  pointer to the 64-byte array to parse

 *

 *  The signature must consist of a 32-byte big endian R value, followed by a

 *  32-byte big endian S value. If R or S fall outside of [0..order-1], the

 *  encoding is invalid. R and S with value 0 are allowed in the encoding.

 *

 *  After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or R or

 *  S are zero, the resulting sig value is guaranteed to fail verification for

 *  any message and public key.

 */

SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,

    const unsigned char *input64

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);

/** Parse a DER ECDSA signature.

 *

 *  Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise.

 *  Args: ctx:      pointer to a context object

 *  Out:  sig:      pointer to a signature object

 *  In:   input:    pointer to the signature to be parsed

 *        inputlen: the length of the array pointed to be input

 *

 *  This function will accept any valid DER encoded signature, even if the

 *  encoded numbers are out of range.

 *

 *  After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or the

 *  encoded numbers are out of range, signature verification with it is

 *  guaranteed to fail for every message and public key.

 */

SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,

    const unsigned char *input,

    size_t inputlen

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);

/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in DER format.

 *

 *  Returns: 1 if enough space was available to serialize, 0 otherwise

 *  Args:   ctx:       pointer to a context object

 *  Out:    output:    pointer to an array to store the DER serialization

 *  In/Out: outputlen: pointer to a length integer. Initially, this integer

 *                     should be set to the length of output. After the call

 *                     it will be set to the length of the serialization (even

 *                     if 0 was returned).

 *  In:     sig:       pointer to an initialized signature object

 */

SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    unsigned char *output,

    size_t *outputlen,

    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);

/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in compact (64 byte) format.

 *

 *  Returns: 1

 *  Args:   ctx:       pointer to a context object

 *  Out:    output64:  pointer to a 64-byte array to store the compact serialization

 *  In:     sig:       pointer to an initialized signature object

 *

 *  See secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact for details about the encoding.

 */

SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    unsigned char *output64,

    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);

/** Verify an ECDSA signature.

 *

 *  Returns: 1: correct signature

 *           0: incorrect or unparseable signature

 *  Args:    ctx:       pointer to a context object

 *  In:      sig:       the signature being verified.

 *           msghash32: the 32-byte message hash being verified.

 *                      The verifier must make sure to apply a cryptographic

 *                      hash function to the message by itself and not accept an

 *                      msghash32 value directly. Otherwise, it would be easy to

 *                      create a "valid" signature without knowledge of the

 *                      secret key. See also

 *                      https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/a/81116/35586 for more

 *                      background on this topic.

 *           pubkey:    pointer to an initialized public key to verify with.

 *

 * To avoid accepting malleable signatures, only ECDSA signatures in lower-S

 * form are accepted.

 *

 * If you need to accept ECDSA signatures from sources that do not obey this

 * rule, apply secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize to the signature prior to

 * verification, but be aware that doing so results in malleable signatures.

 *

 * For details, see the comments for that function.

 */

SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,

    const unsigned char *msghash32,

    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);

/** Convert a signature to a normalized lower-S form.

 *

 *  Returns: 1 if sigin was not normalized, 0 if it already was.

 *  Args: ctx:    pointer to a context object

 *  Out:  sigout: pointer to a signature to fill with the normalized form,

 *                or copy if the input was already normalized. (can be NULL if

 *                you're only interested in whether the input was already

 *                normalized).

 *  In:   sigin:  pointer to a signature to check/normalize (can be identical to sigout)

 *

 *  With ECDSA a third-party can forge a second distinct signature of the same

 *  message, given a single initial signature, but without knowing the key. This

 *  is done by negating the S value modulo the order of the curve, 'flipping'

 *  the sign of the random point R which is not included in the signature.

 *

 *  Forgery of the same message isn't universally problematic, but in systems

 *  where message malleability or uniqueness of signatures is important this can

 *  cause issues. This forgery can be blocked by all verifiers forcing signers

 *  to use a normalized form.

 *

 *  The lower-S form reduces the size of signatures slightly on average when

 *  variable length encodings (such as DER) are used and is cheap to verify,

 *  making it a good choice. Security of always using lower-S is assured because

 *  anyone can trivially modify a signature after the fact to enforce this

 *  property anyway.

 *

 *  The lower S value is always between 0x1 and

 *  0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF5D576E7357A4501DDFE92F46681B20A0,

 *  inclusive.

 *

 *  No other forms of ECDSA malleability are known and none seem likely, but

 *  there is no formal proof that ECDSA, even with this additional restriction,

 *  is free of other malleability. Commonly used serialization schemes will also

 *  accept various non-unique encodings, so care should be taken when this

 *  property is required for an application.

 *

 *  The secp256k1_ecdsa_sign function will by default create signatures in the

 *  lower-S form, and secp256k1_ecdsa_verify will not accept others. In case

 *  signatures come from a system that cannot enforce this property,

 *  secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize must be called before verification.

 */

SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigout,

    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigin

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);

/** An implementation of RFC6979 (using HMAC-SHA256) as nonce generation function.

 * If a data pointer is passed, it is assumed to be a pointer to 32 bytes of

 * extra entropy.

 */

SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979;

/** A default safe nonce generation function (currently equal to secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979). */

SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_default;

/** Create an ECDSA signature.

 *

 *  Returns: 1: signature created

 *           0: the nonce generation function failed, or the secret key was invalid.

 *  Args:    ctx:       pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).

 *  Out:     sig:       pointer to an array where the signature will be placed.

 *  In:      msghash32: the 32-byte message hash being signed.

 *           seckey:    pointer to a 32-byte secret key.

 *           noncefp:   pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL,

 *                      secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used.

 *           ndata:     pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function

 *                      (can be NULL). If it is non-NULL and

 *                      secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used, then ndata must be a

 *                      pointer to 32-bytes of additional data.

 *

 * The created signature is always in lower-S form. See

 * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize for more details.

 */

SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,

    const unsigned char *msghash32,

    const unsigned char *seckey,

    secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp,

    const void *ndata

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);

/** Verify an elliptic curve secret key.

 *

 *  A secret key is valid if it is not 0 and less than the secp256k1 curve order

 *  when interpreted as an integer (most significant byte first). The

 *  probability of choosing a 32-byte string uniformly at random which is an

 *  invalid secret key is negligible. However, if it does happen it should

 *  be assumed that the randomness source is severely broken and there should

 *  be no retry.

 *

 *  Returns: 1: secret key is valid

 *           0: secret key is invalid

 *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object.

 *  In:      seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key.

 */

SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    const unsigned char *seckey

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2);

/** Compute the public key for a secret key.

 *

 *  Returns: 1: secret was valid, public key stores.

 *           0: secret was invalid, try again.

 *  Args:    ctx:    pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).

 *  Out:     pubkey: pointer to the created public key.

 *  In:      seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key.

 */

SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,

    const unsigned char *seckey

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);

/** Negates a secret key in place.

 *

 *  Returns: 0 if the given secret key is invalid according to

 *           secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify. 1 otherwise

 *  Args:   ctx:    pointer to a context object

 *  In/Out: seckey: pointer to the 32-byte secret key to be negated. If the

 *                  secret key is invalid according to

 *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0 and

 *                  seckey will be set to some unspecified value.

 */

SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    unsigned char *seckey

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2);

/** Negates a public key in place.

 *

 *  Returns: 1 always

 *  Args:   ctx:        pointer to a context object

 *  In/Out: pubkey:     pointer to the public key to be negated.

 */

SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2);

/** Tweak a secret key by adding tweak to it.

 *

 *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the resulting secret key would be

 *           invalid (only when the tweak is the negation of the secret key). 1

 *           otherwise.

 *  Args:    ctx:   pointer to a context object.

 *  In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key. If the secret key is

 *                  invalid according to secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this

 *                  function returns 0. seckey will be set to some unspecified

 *                  value if this function returns 0.

 *  In:    tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak, which must be valid according to

 *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify or 32 zero bytes. For uniformly

 *                  random 32-byte tweaks, the chance of being invalid is

 *                  negligible (around 1 in 2^128).

 */

SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    unsigned char *seckey,

    const unsigned char *tweak32

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);

/** Tweak a public key by adding tweak times the generator to it.

 *

 *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the resulting public key would be

 *           invalid (only when the tweak is the negation of the corresponding

 *           secret key). 1 otherwise.

 *  Args:    ctx:   pointer to a context object.

 *  In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key object. pubkey will be set to an

 *                  invalid value if this function returns 0.

 *  In:    tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak, which must be valid according to

 *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify or 32 zero bytes. For uniformly

 *                  random 32-byte tweaks, the chance of being invalid is

 *                  negligible (around 1 in 2^128).

 */

SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,

    const unsigned char *tweak32

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);

/** Tweak a secret key by multiplying it by a tweak.

 *

 *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise.

 *  Args:   ctx:    pointer to a context object.

 *  In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key. If the secret key is

 *                  invalid according to secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this

 *                  function returns 0. seckey will be set to some unspecified

 *                  value if this function returns 0.

 *  In:    tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. If the tweak is invalid according to

 *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0. For

 *                  uniformly random 32-byte arrays the chance of being invalid

 *                  is negligible (around 1 in 2^128).

 */

SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    unsigned char *seckey,

    const unsigned char *tweak32

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);

/** Tweak a public key by multiplying it by a tweak value.

 *

 *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise.

 *  Args:    ctx:   pointer to a context object.

 *  In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key object. pubkey will be set to an

 *                  invalid value if this function returns 0.

 *  In:    tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. If the tweak is invalid according to

 *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0. For

 *                  uniformly random 32-byte arrays the chance of being invalid

 *                  is negligible (around 1 in 2^128).

 */

SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,

    const unsigned char *tweak32

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);

/** Randomizes the context to provide enhanced protection against side-channel leakage.

 *

 *  Returns: 1: randomization successful

 *           0: error

 *  Args:    ctx:       pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).

 *  In:      seed32:    pointer to a 32-byte random seed (NULL resets to initial state).

 *

 * While secp256k1 code is written and tested to be constant-time no matter what

 * secret values are, it is possible that a compiler may output code which is not,

 * and also that the CPU may not emit the same radio frequencies or draw the same

 * amount of power for all values. Randomization of the context shields against

 * side-channel observations which aim to exploit secret-dependent behaviour in

 * certain computations which involve secret keys.

 *

 * It is highly recommended to call this function on contexts returned from

 * secp256k1_context_create or secp256k1_context_clone (or from the corresponding

 * functions in secp256k1_preallocated.h) before using these contexts to call API

 * functions that perform computations involving secret keys, e.g., signing and

 * public key generation. It is possible to call this function more than once on

 * the same context, and doing so before every few computations involving secret

 * keys is recommended as a defense-in-depth measure. Randomization of the static

 * context secp256k1_context_static is not supported.

 *

 * Currently, the random seed is mainly used for blinding multiplications of a

 * secret scalar with the elliptic curve base point. Multiplications of this

 * kind are performed by exactly those API functions which are documented to

 * require a context that is not secp256k1_context_static. As a rule of thumb,

 * these are all functions which take a secret key (or a keypair) as an input.

 * A notable exception to that rule is the ECDH module, which relies on a different

 * kind of elliptic curve point multiplication and thus does not benefit from

 * enhanced protection against side-channel leakage currently.

 */

SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_context_randomize(

    secp256k1_context *ctx,

    const unsigned char *seed32

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);

/** Add a number of public keys together.

 *

 *  Returns: 1: the sum of the public keys is valid.

 *           0: the sum of the public keys is not valid.

 *  Args:   ctx:        pointer to a context object.

 *  Out:    out:        pointer to a public key object for placing the resulting public key.

 *  In:     ins:        pointer to array of pointers to public keys.

 *          n:          the number of public keys to add together (must be at least 1).

 */

SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    secp256k1_pubkey *out,

    const secp256k1_pubkey * const *ins,

    size_t n

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);

/** Compute a tagged hash as defined in BIP-340.

 *

 *  This is useful for creating a message hash and achieving domain separation

 *  through an application-specific tag. This function returns

 *  SHA256(SHA256(tag)||SHA256(tag)||msg). Therefore, tagged hash

 *  implementations optimized for a specific tag can precompute the SHA256 state

 *  after hashing the tag hashes.

 *

 *  Returns: 1 always.

 *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object

 *  Out:  hash32: pointer to a 32-byte array to store the resulting hash

 *  In:      tag: pointer to an array containing the tag

 *        taglen: length of the tag array

 *           msg: pointer to an array containing the message

 *        msglen: length of the message array

 */

SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_tagged_sha256(

    const secp256k1_context *ctx,

    unsigned char *hash32,

    const unsigned char *tag,

    size_t taglen,

    const unsigned char *msg,

    size_t msglen

) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);

#ifdef __cplusplus

}

#endif

#endif /* SECP256K1_H */